South Africaโs cybercrime landscape has reached a troubling inflection point. The recent reports of hijacked SARS eFiling profiles, combined with an ongoing surge in social-media-based payment fraud, reveal a deeper structural weakness: the country lacks a unified, compliance-led framework to safeguard digital identity and transactional integrity across financial and government systems.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ผ๐บ๐บ๐ผ๐ป ๐ง๐ต๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฑ: ๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ผ๐บ๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐๐ถ๐ด๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ถ๐๐
Whether itโs a consumer tricked by a fraudulent Facebook advert or a taxpayer whose eFiling profile has been hijacked, the underlying vector is the same โ identity compromise.
Criminals exploit verification weaknesses and siloed systems, moving seamlessly between social platforms, government portals, and banks. Once personal or banking information is captured, syndicates can reroute refunds, apply for loans, or trigger fraudulent payments โ often before victims even realise whatโs happened.
While banks, the CIPC, and SARS each have their own verification controls, the absence of inter-institutional coordination โ underpinned by lawful data-sharing protocols โ creates exploitable gaps.
๐ช๐ต๐ ๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฝ๐น๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ ๐ถ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ถ๐ป๐ธ
The reflexive response to cybercrime is often โmore technology.โ But technology without governance merely shifts the risk elsewhere.
The real solution lies in compliance-aligned data cooperation โ ensuring that fraud detection and intelligence-sharing operate within the bounds of POPIA, FICA, and PCI-DSS.
No such unified framework currently exists in South Africa. Financial institutions, regulators, and government agencies still operate under fragmented mandates that limit proactive coordination, even when criminal activity clearly overlaps.
๐๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฑ๐๐ฐ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ถ๐ด๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ถ๐๐ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ด๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐บ๐ฒ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ธ (๐๐๐๐)
At IPSE: Tech Law Services, weโve been developing a conceptual framework that extends our earlier work on social media payment fraud to address identity-driven risks like eFiling hijacking.
We call it the Digital Identity Integrity Framework (DIIF) โ a compliance-first model for secure cooperation between banks, SARS, the CIPC, and regulators.
๐๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ & ๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฝ๐น๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ
Establish a unified regulatory and legal foundation that allows limited, lawful data verification between institutions.
โข POPIA and FICA-aligned data-sharing protocols
โข Joint risk assessments and breach-notification templates
โข An โaccredited compliance partnerโ model to support the Information Regulatorโs oversight and certification of data-handling practices
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ฑ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ด๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ ๐๐ป๐ด๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ
Deploy AI and heuristic tools to identify suspicious digital activity โ for instance, multiple login attempts or changes in taxpayer banking details.
โข Trigger consumer verification before sensitive changes are applied
โข Leverage bank apps for secondary authentication (e.g., โapprove this changeโ prompts)
โข Integrate with SABRIC or FIC intelligence for cross-platform pattern detection
๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ-๐๐ป๐๐๐ถ๐๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฏ
Create a privacy-compliant fraud intelligence-sharing mechanism between SARS, banks, and regulators.
โข Minimal-data, encrypted reporting of confirmed incidents
โข Real-time alerts for emerging high-risk behaviours or fraud syndicates
โข Operate through a regulated intermediary such as an accredited compliance partner (e.g., IPSE) to ensure privacy safeguards
๐ฆ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ด๐ถ๐ฐ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ถ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ & ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฒ๐๐
Develop white papers, joint training, and sector briefings to guide policymakers and compliance teams.
โข Cross-sector workshops led by accredited compliance partners
โข Public awareness initiatives to rebuild consumer trust
โข Policy recommendations for Treasury, SARS, and the Information Regulator
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ผ๐น๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ฐ๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฑ๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฝ๐น๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ป๐ฒ๐ฟ๐
In my recent Tech4Law article, I argued that South Africaโs Information Regulator could expand its reach and technical capability by accrediting trusted compliance partners to support oversight and implementation.
The same principle applies here: regulated intermediaries can act as lawful, neutral connectors between institutions, facilitating data collaboration while ensuring strict adherence to POPIA and other laws.
๐ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐น ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐๐ผ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
If South Africa is serious about protecting its citizensโ digital identities, we must move beyond institutional silos. A Digital Identity Integrity Framework, supported by accredited compliance partners, can provide the governance and collaboration backbone the country currently lacks.
This approach wonโt just mitigate eFiling and payment fraud โ it will restore confidence in the digital economy, strengthen compliance culture, and position our banks, regulators, and service providers as leaders in lawful innovation.
By Pรฉru du Toit, Founder of IPSE: Tech Law Services
About the Author:
Pรฉru du Toit is the founder of IPSE: Tech Law Services, a legal technology consultancy that helps South African businesses align cybersecurity, privacy, and compliance under frameworks such as POPIA, FICA, and ISO 27001.









